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ABSTRACT. This article explores the free exercise of religion under the United 
States and Japanese Constitutions. The free exercise clause of the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution are the 
key provisions. The article focuses on the question of mandatory exemptions to laws 
generally applicable laws. In other words, must government give exemptions based 
on religion to laws that apply the same to everyone, but create a burden on 
individuals with particular religious practices. The United States Supreme Court said 
the answer is "no" in Employment Division v. Smith. The Japanese Supreme Court 
suggested the answer is "yes" in Matsumodo v. Kobayashi. This article suggests that 
the Japanese Supreme Court better addressed what is necessary for the free exercise 
of religion, and provided better suggestions on how to achieve it than the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Keywords: Free Exercise of Religion, U.S. Constitution, Japanese Constitution, First 
Amendment, and Article 20 
Introduction 
This article compares the constitutional protections afforded the free 
exercise of religion in the United States and Japan. The article focuses 
solely on the question of whether government entities are required to 
provide exemptions to generally applicable laws-that is, laws that apply on 
their face and purpose to everyone regardless of their religion. The article 
does not explore the question of intentional discrimination against and 
individual or individuals based on religion, as both constitutional systems 
protect against such discrimination, although there have been some notable 
exceptions in the jurisprudence and practices of both countries. 
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When evaluating the availability of mandatory exemptions to generally 
applicable laws the Japanese Supreme Court has actually provided broader 
protection than the United States Supreme Court. However, this comparison 
is complex because of the differences in the legal systems of the two 
countries and the specific holdings addressed below. Significantly, an 
underlying question may be raised as to whether greater religious 
heterogeneity is more or less likely to result in mandatory exemptions to 
generally applicable laws. Yet, in the end, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that from the perspective of free exercise of religion for everyone, including 
religious minorities, the Japanese Supreme Court decision in Matsumodo v. 
Kobayashi, 1 is far more protective of free exercise by all than the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith? 
I. United States Free Exercise Jurisprudence and Employment Division 
v. Smith 
In Employment Division v. Smith,3 Native American employees of a drug 
rehabilitation center were fired, and subsequently denied unemployment 
benefits because they used peyote at a ritual service.4 There was no 
evidence that these employees used peyote at any time other than the ritual 
services; in fact, their religion forbade use outside of ritual ceremonies. 5 
They sued under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution to receive unemployment benefits. In an opinion 
written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the state need not 
create exemptions to laws of general applicability to accommodate religious 
practices. 6 The opinion noted that states remained free to create exemptions 
to laws that have an adverse impact on religious practices. 7 
The facts of the case are well documented. 8 As noted above, two 
members of the Native American Church were denied unemployment 
benefits after being fired from their jobs at a substance abuse rehabilitation 
center. 9 The employees were fired because they had chewed peyote, an 
illegal substance under Oregon law, during religious rituals. 10 Oregon law 
stated that being fired for misconduct-which is how the firing was 
characterized-recluses the receipt of unemployment benefits. 11 Neither 
individual abused peyote and there was no evidence that either had used 
peyote anywhere other than in religious ceremonies. 12 In fact, it would 
violate the tenets of the Native American Church to use peyote outside of 
appropriate religious rituals because the substance has significant religious 
import for members of the faith. 13 Oregon, unlike many states and the 
federal government, did not have a religious exemption for Native 
American peyote use under its general drug laws. 14 Thus, the Court had to 
decide whether the two men denied unemployment benefits had a 
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constitutional right to an exemption to the drug laws given the religious 
nature of their peyote use. 15 An exemption would have precluded the denial 
of unemployment benefits based on ritual peyote use. 16 
The backdrop of legal precedent seemed to favor the men, but that 
precedent-contrary to popular belief-was anything but clear or terribly 
helpful to religious minorities. The precedent many thought would be key to 
the decision was Sherbert v. Verner, 17 which held that a state must have a 
compelling governmental interest for denying unemployment benefits to a 
person who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath. 18 Relevant, but 
not decisive on my reading of the Sherbert opinion, was the fact that the 
state unemployment laws contained a number of exemptions for 
nonreligious reasons. 19 
Another decision, Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 was also potentially relevant. 
In Yoder the Court held that Amish families with high school age children 
were entitled to exemptions from the state's compulsory education laws in 
the absence of a compelling state interest.21 The court looked at the Amish 
community's track record of good citizenship, hard work, and the success of 
its young people within the community to demonstrate that the state had no 
compelling interest for denying the exemption. 22 
Given this precedent most people believed that the battle lines in Smith 
would be drawn over whether the state had an adequate compelling 
governmental interest. In fact, Oregon's attorney general at that time later 
pointed out that the state never argued for disposing of the compelling 
interest test, 23 but rather argued that compliance with the state's drug laws 
satisfied the burden under that test, especially in light of post Sherbert and 
Yoder case law?4 As will be seen, that subsequent case law suggested that 
Sherbert and Yoder were primarily paper tigers, at least in the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Between Yoder and Smith the Court decided a string of free exercise 
exemption cases. With the exception of a few unemployment cases the 
person seeking the exemption never won?5 In some cases the nature of the 
government institution, i.e. the military or prisons, served as a basis for not 
applying the compelling interest test. 26 In others, the relief requested was 
decisive in not applying the compelling interest test. For example, cases 
where the government entity involved would have had to change its policies 
to grant an exemption?7 Finally, there were cases where the court ostensibly 
applied the compelling interest test, but in a manner that made it anything 
but strict scrutiny?8 It should be noted, however, that Sherbert and Yoder 
did influence the outcomes of some lower court cases?9 
The Smith Court relied on the post-Yoder decisions, as well as some pre-
herbert decisions, to hold that Sherbert is limited to the unemployment 
context where there are generally a variety of exemptions built into the 
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unemployment laws. 3° Furthermore, the claim in Smith was different from 
earlier free exercise cases granting exemptions to unemployment laws 
because the claimants in Smith sought an exemption based on illegal 
conduct while the claimants in the earlier cases sought an exemption based 
on religious conduct that was otherwise legal. 31 Yoder was harder to 
distinguish, but the Court created the concept of "hybrid rights"-and I 
stress the word "created"-because the concept makes no legal sense as 
explained below. "Hybrid rights" cases are cases in which the Free Exercise 
Clause right is connected to some other important right (in Yoder parental 
rights). 32 This concept was used to distinguish several earlier cases that 
involved freedom of expression as well as free exercise concems,33 and to 
distinguish Yoder. Yet, to characterize Yoder as a hybrid rights case is 
patently disingenuous. 
Moreover, the concept of"hybrid rights" makes no sense whatsoever. Is 
the Court saying that two inadequate constitutional rights combined can 
make an adequate one? If so, it would not be hard to hybridize almost 
anything into a viable constitutional right. Or are hybrid rights the 
combination of two adequate constitutional rights? This possibility is 
precluded by the Smith Court's reasoning because clearly the Free Exercise 
Clause right would be inadequate by itself in an exemption case under the 
Smith Court's reasoning.34 This leaves two possibilities. First, the other 
constitutional right in the hybrid rights context would be adequate on its 
own and the Free Exercise Clause right is not, in which case why mention 
the Free Exercise Clause in exemption cases because it essentially serves no 
function other than being an anti-discrimination principle.35 Second, and 
apparently accurate, hybrid rights are just a judicial creation to get around 
inconvenient precedent. The last possibility seems to be the obvious 
answer. 36 
The mischaracterization of Yoder would be more troubling if the 
traditional story of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence were accurate, but 
the reality is that Sherbert and Yoder were never the panacea they have been 
made out to be. 37 The idea of a compelling interest test held a lot of 
promise, but in the hands of shifting majorities on the Court that promise 
was never realized; although it was sometimes realized in the lower courts. 
Divorcing Smith from all the important baggage regarding stare decises, 
etc .... , we are left with the basic notion that the Free Exercise Clause does 
not require exemptions to generally applicable laws. The argument seems to 
be that because these laws are religion neutral the Free Exercise Clause has 
no impact on them except through the political process. 38 This, of course, 
begs the question of whether such laws can ever be neutral given the vast 
array of religions and huge amount of government activity in the United 
States.39 
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One factor to consider in this regard is that the United States Supreme 
Court's initial struggles with the issue led to the development of a 
dichotomy between belief and practice. Reynolds v. U.S., 40 is generally 
considered a major early precedent for this dichotomy. Essentially, the 
dichotomy suggests that belief must be protected in order to have religious 
freedom, but behavior/practice may be regulated (under generally 
applicable laws in the modem version) for the good of society.41 This 
dichotomy was altered in the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner, 42 and in 
tum this "great advancement" was undermined by the Court's decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.43 
This account of the evolution and subsequent devolution of free exercise 
rights is flawed. Sherbert was not the panacea that it has been made out to 
be, and Smith while seemingly altering legal doctrine, may simply be a 
recognition of what the Court was doing all along.44 Religious minorities 
(especially non-Christian religious minorities) did not reap great benefits 
from Sherbert,45 and Smith seems consistent both with pre-Sherbert cases 
such as Braunfeld v. Brown46 and with post-Sherbert cases such as Goldman 
v. Weinberger,47 Bowen v. Roy,48 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association.49 
Thus, if Smith is a flawed decision-and this article asserts that it is-
the flaw seems inherent in U.S. Free Exercise Clause analysis generally. In 
this view, Smith is simply an explicitstatement of what has been going on all 
along, and the infatuation with Sherbert and its progeny has served to 
obfuscate that fact. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's analysis of laws of general 
applicability in Smith, 5° and most of the cases that preceded it is based in the 
assumption that a "law of general applicability" in the free exercise context 
is really generally applicable. 51 In the end, the Court's approach in Smith 
was predetermined-at least in part-by its acceptance of this baseline, 
notably without discussion. If the baseline is questionable, the Court's 
failure to address it is potentially more problematic than the mental 
gymnastics it used to reinterpret Sherbert and Yoder. 
The belief/practice dichotomy and the notion of "laws of general 
applicability" make perfect sense to many people. After all, if every 
religious faith or denomination were accommodated many laws would not 
apply in the same way to everyone, and might be harder to enforce. 52 This 
may be so, but the assertion contains an implicit weighing of values. In this 
weighing, the value assigned to application of generally applicable laws to 
all citizens outweighs the free exercise interests of religious minorities, who 
are less likely than dominant faiths to receive exemptions through the 
legislative process that gave rise to the "generally applicable" law. 53 Thus, 
while the dominant tradition and values are projected both into the 
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legislative process and the judicial evaluation of the product of that process 
in the free exercise context, minority traditions and values are less likely to 
be considered or reflected in the legislative process, and are outweighed by 
the interest in "general applicability" in the judicial process. 
Under these circumstances there would appear to be a great imbalance in 
the social reality of Free Exercise rights for members of practice centered 
minority faiths and members of more dominant faiths. This is troubling 
because it would seem to run counter to First Amendment doctrine, 
specifically the counter-majoritarian implications and tradition of the First 
Amendment; yet it should have been expected because many judges are not 
equipped to understand the impact on a religious minority of an imposition 
on religious practice. 
For practice oriented religions, such as Judaism, the Native American 
Church, or Seventh Day Adventism, rules of general applicability can have 
a profound impact, and exemptions would be harder to come by in many 
areas, at least prospectively. Goldman v. Weinberger provides a post-
Sherbert, but pre-Smith, example of this. 54 Consider also the example of 
Sunday closing laws. 55 These closing laws could be devastating to an 
Orthodox Jew's or Seventh Day Adventist's livelihood. She must close her 
store from Friday afternoon until sundown Saturday, thus causing the store 
to be closed during the best sales period of the week (excluding Sunday). 
These laws of "general applicability" are only general if one buys into a 
particular baseline, that is, that they apply to everyone the same way. Yet 
this baseline is open to question. No mainstream Christian business56 will 
face the same impact for religious reasons as the Jewish or Seventh Day 
Adventist business, because the supposedly neutral law reflects the 
prevailing Christian norm. 57 Interestingly, even if that norm has shifted to a 
more secular norm since the situation that gave rise to the Sunday closing 
cases in the early 1960's, the new norm may be equally unhelpful to 
religious minorities. 
The belief/practice dichotomy reflected in Smith strips the Free Exercise 
Clause, at least as it relates to practice oriented religions, of one of its most 
useful purposes-accommodating religious practices when government 
action threatens to directly or indirectly penalize those who engage in such 
practices. 58 The dominant/majority religious community will generally be 
protected because its beliefs will be understood, and perhaps empathized 
with, but for religious minorities quite the opposite might be true. 59 The 
Smith Court advocated a majoritarian approach, since it will most often be 
religious minorities60 who need to seek exemptions to generally applicable 
laws, and it is precisely those same minorities who might have the hardest 
time getting such exemptions enacted. 
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II. The Japanese Constitution and Free Exercise of Religion and 
Matsumodo v. Kobayashi61 
Given the above discussion one might expect that the Japanese courts would 
view Free Exercise in the same way Justice Scalia did writing for the 
majority in Smith. After all, social norms,62 uniformity in rule 
applicability,63 and viewing one's role in light of cultural expectations are 
strong64-although certainly not universal-norms in Japan. Individuality in 
Japan often takes a back seat to cultural expectations, at least in the public 
sphere. 65 
Moreover, views on religion in Japan are generally inclusive and/or 
secular. 66 This means that the Japanese generally do not think it necessary to 
subscribe to only one faith or to any faith at all. 67 Many Japanese follow 
Buddhist and Shinto rituals, and some of these people may also entertain 
theistic notions as well-in the sense that they believe there is some greater 
force out there, but do not see the need to define it along sectarian or 
definite lines.68 Under this view religious requirements may be perceived as 
somewhat flexible, even as they are respected. 69 Additionally, many 
Japanese are atheist or agnostic. 70 
Despite the issues of ethnic discrimination that Japan has struggled 
with/ 1 religious intolerance is less of an issue in Japan. 72 The one religious 
trait that many Japanese people do find troubling is proselytization. It is 
viewed as intolerant to try to change other people because there is only one 
way to be saved, etc ... 73 This is highly relevant given the faith of the 
plaintiff in the leading Japanese religious exemption case discussed below. 
Japanese perceptions of cultural uniformity, and a somewhat flexible 
view about religious duties, would seem to create a great likelihood that 
religious exemptions to generally applicable laws would not be ordered by 
Japanese courts. Of course, one might argue that Japanese culture's general 
religious tolerance might point toward granting religious exemptions, but 
the U.S. is supposedly a land of religious tolerance and that did not keep 
Justice Scalia and the Smith majority from fearing that mandatory 
exemptions would potentially make each person a law unto himself or 
herself. 74 Every one being a law unto himself or herself would be 
particularly troubling in Japan where individuality tends to bend to cultural 
expectation in the public sphere. 
Yet, the Japanese Supreme Court when faced with such a case engaged 
in reasoning that is virtually the opposite of that in Smith.75 In Matsumodo 
v. Kobayashi,76 often referred to as the "Kobe Technical College" case, 
because that college was the defendant in the suit,77 a petty bench of the 
Japanese Supreme Coure8 required the college to accommodate a Jehovah's 
Witness who would not engage in Kendo/9 one of the college's physical 
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education requirements. 80 The Court reasoned that for everyone to have free 
exercise of religion as expressed in the Japanese Constitution, 
accommodations are appropriate because for some people a seemingly 
neutral law can interfere with freedom ofreligion. 81 The court held that such 
accommodations must be balanced against the interests of others and 
society,82 but that the government must have a very good reason to infringe 
on the interests of the religious individual.83 The court also explained that 
such accommodations are a way to prevent a negative impact on the 
religious person created by the law. 84 Most importantly, to the extent that an 
accommodation allows the religious person to avoid a requirement or 
hardship the government may require an equally demanding alternative. 85 
This reasoning demonstrates two inherent flaws in the reasoning of the 
United States Supreme Court in Smith. First, the idea that the "general 
applicability" of "laws of general applicability" should be determined 
without regard to the impact they have on religious people. Second, that 
mandatory exemption creates some sort of windfall for the exempted 
individual rather than equalizing things (or doing so once government 
imposes an alternative requirement). 
It is important to note that the Japanese Supreme Court ordered an 
exemption in the case before it,86 and held that such an exemption does not 
create an establishment of religion,87 but the court did not hold that 
exemptions are always mandated since that issue was not before the court.88 
This has to do with Japanese legal approaches and the nature of the claim. 
In Japan, the Supreme court can decide the issue before it, but to avoid a 
case by case approach the legislature must pass a law, which assuming it is 
constitutional, would make the norm applicable nationwide (or within the 
territory of local legislatures that pass such laws). 89 Still, the test the Court 
used demonstrates that exemptions are appropriate under the Japanese 
Constitution when a general law interferes with religious practices, subject 
to the balancing of interests. 90 In fact, since the case was decided there have 
been laws passed that require accommodation and Japanese courts have 
upheld those laws. 
Given the U.S. Supreme Court's nearly consistent failure to recognize 
free exercise exemptions going back more than a century how is it that the 
Japanese Supreme Court so clearly saw what a majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court has often failed to see? That is, religious exemptions need 
not interfere with orderly society and exemptions are not windfalls, but 
rather may be a way to equalize the burdens imposed by laws that may have 
considered the majority's social and religious norms, but not lesser known 
religious norms. I will make a controversial assertion here, namely, the 
reason is that the U.S. Supreme Court is more effected by dualistic Western 
and Christian norms, even if only as a matter of cultural traditions, and-
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and this is the most controversial part-the Smith, Braunfeld, Reynolds, 
etc ... majorities-were unable or unwilling to reflect adequately to see 
beyond their dualistic views of the world. This is clear from the reasoning in 
those cases as opposed to the holdings, as it would be possible to adequately 
reflect and still come to the same conclusions those courts did, but not with 
the same reasoning those Court's used. Lest there be any doubt, I am 
suggesting that the Smith, Goldman, Lyng, Braunfeld, Reynolds, Davis, 
etc .... Courts simply engaged in reflexive analysis of the underlying issues 
and thus the answers in those cases were predetermined, even if in a case 
like Smith that required logical gymnastics in light of precedent. 
None of this says anything about how those Courts should have ruled on 
the issue. Rather, it suggests that those Courts never seriously considered 
the central issues of the relationship between belief and practice in many 
religions, nor did those Courts consider the core issue of what it means to 
say that a law is "generally applicable" in the free exercise context. The 
Japanese Supreme Court, however, seemed aware of both ofthese issues. 91 
The Japanese Court did not share many of the religious and cultural 
presuppositions of a heavily Christianized AND secularized society, yet it 
did at least potentially share those of a highly secularized society. 92 
Does this mean that there is no escape from the sort of reasoning we 
have seen in numerous U.S. Supreme Court free exercise decisions? No. 
The Japanese Court may not have shared the same cultural predispositions 
as the U.S. Court, but still the cultural predispositions of the Japanese 
Supreme Court would have seemed equally likely to lead to the same result 
as that in Smith and its predecessors. Yet it didn't. From a legal reasoning 
standpoint this is because the Japanese Court considered what it means to 
call a law what the U.S. Court labeled "generally applicable" in the free 
exercise context and because it seems to have considered the seriousness of 
religious practice. 93 
Another factor some might point to is that the Japanese Court used a 
balancing approach, whereas Justice Scalia and several Justices in the Smith 
majority tend toward formalism. 94 This, however, explains little. First 
several of the Courts in pre-Smith decisions tended more toward balancing 
than formalism and yet used formalistic approaches that are at least 
consistent with Smith. Moreover, the Japanese Supreme Court often prefers 
formalism to balancing approaches. 
Moreover, the Japanese Supreme Court also provided a solution to the 
Smith majority's concern about a flood of exemption claims were 
exemptions to be mandated. The Japanese Supreme Court noted that it was 
acceptable for a government entity granting an exemption to mandate the 
person seeking an exemption meet an alternative requirement which does 
not burden his or her religious free exercise. 95 The plaintiff in Matsumodo v. 
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Kobayashi had proposed several such alternatives and the court noted this.96 
Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court never even considered this possibility in 
Smith. 
Conclusion 
This article has suggested that the Smith decision reflects embedded 
western, Christocentric and secular centric cultural predispositions. Sadly, 
the Smith Court could have engaged in more reflective analysis (and might 
have ruled the same way or the opposite way on the ultimate issue in that 
case based on this more reflective analysis). In fact, the Japanese Supreme 
Court demonstrated in Matsumodo v. Kobayashi, that it is possible for a 
court to reflect carefully on what the free exercise of religion means even in 
the face of contrary culturally embedded preconceptions. 
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